By Carpe Diem
As I was preparing this post of energy charts, I noticed that Matthew O’Brien at The Atlantic just published The Most Important Economic Stories of 2013—in 40 Graphs
and guess what? Not one of the 40 graphs highlighted what might be not
just one of the most important economic stories of 2013, but might
qualify as the most important economic story of the last decade: The Great American Energy Boom.
The amazing shale revolution taking place in America’s energy sector
remains the strongest single sector of the US economy and provides the
strongest reason to remain optimistic about America’s economic future.
I might do a more
comprehensive group of energy charts later at the end of the year, but
for now I would think any of the first three charts below would quality
to be included in The Atlantic’s graphs of the most important economic
stories of 2013: a) US crude oil production in November was the highest
in more than a quarter century, b) the US now has three active oil
fields producing more than one million barrels per day, which qualifies
them to join a very elite group of only ten super-giant oil fields in
the world that have ever produced at that level, and c) natural gas
production in the Marcellus region of Pennsylvania and West Virginia has
increased almost 8 times in just the last four years, and that region
now supplies 18% of America’s natural gas.
For now, here are my five energy charts, based on data recently released.
1. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported today
that US crude oil production averaged 8.0 million barrels per day (bpd)
in November, which is the highest monthly output since November 1988
(see chart above). The EIA expects US crude oil production will average
7.5 million bpd this year and 8.5 million bpd in 2014.
2. Based on an EIA report yesterday, the US now has three elite, super-giant oil fields producing more than one million bpd as of December: Permian Basin and Eagle Ford in Texas and Bakken in North Dakota (just hit the 1 million bpd mark this month). In recent years, there have been only 7 oil fields worldwide producing at the one million bpd level, and three of those are in the US. The other four non-US super giant oil fields are Ghawar (Saudi Arabia), Burgan (Kuwait), Cantarell (Mexico), and Daqing (China). In the the 1970s and 1980s, super-giant oil fields in Russia (Samotlor) and Iraq (Kirkuk) (Iraq) produced more than one million bpd level, as did Prudhoe Bay in Alaska when its production peaked in 1979 at 1.5 million bpd. 3. The EIA reported yesterday that natural gas production in the shale-rich Marcellus region that covers Pennsylvania and West Virginia has experienced such a production surge in recent years that it will provide 18% of all natural gas produced in the country this month. Natural gas in the Marcellus region has doubled in less than two years, from 6.39 trillion cubic feet per day in February 2012 to an estimated output of 13.72 trillion cubic feet per day in January 2014. EIA data also shows that estimated natural gas production in the Marcellus region in January 2014 will have tripled since May 2011 (a little more than 2.5 years), and will have quadrupled in only three years since January 2011. Remarkably, Marcellus natural gas output has increased almost 8 times in just four years, from 1.74 trillion cubic feet per day in January 2010 to an estimated 13.72 trillion cubic feet per day next month in January 2014! 4. Thanks to America’s new abundance of shale gas, prices in the US remain incredibly low compared to the rest of the world. As the map above shows, natural gas prices (in MM BTUs) are only about $3 in the US, and prices at 3 to 5 times higher in the rest of the world.
5.
Thanks to the phenomenal energy boom taking place in North Dakota, the
chart above shows the phenomenal housing boom taking place in the Peace
Garden State. In October 1,459 building permits were issued in the
state, which is a 49% increase from the same month last year, and almost
6.5 times the 225 permits issued four years ago in October 2009.
|
The Flying Garuda, is dedicated to whomever enjoys the goodness of this life. I shall share many valuable writings (at least according to my taste), written by me or others with the intention in mind that I can give more to whomever wants to read. I am the Flying Garuda, seeking for opportunity. It sounds so capitalist. No...life is real, we are destined to have a better life.
Dec 12, 2013
Some energy charts that weren’t included in “The Most Important Economic Stories of 2013 – in 40 Graphs,” but maybe should be?
Nov 4, 2013
Bloomberg financial conditions index closes at record high
Posted: 02 Nov 2013 by Carpe Diem Blog
The Bloomberg U.S. Financial Conditions Index (BFICUS)
provides a daily statistical measure of the relative strength of the
U.S. money markets, bond markets, and equity markets, and is considered
an accurate gauge of the overall conditions in U.S. financial and credit
markets. The values of the Bloomberg index are calculated as Z-scores,
which measure the number of standard deviations that daily financial
conditions lie above or below the average of financial conditions during
the January 1994-June 2008 period. The Financial Conditions Index
closed yesterday at 1.65, setting an all-time record index high going
back to 1994 when the index started (see chart above).
The record high level for the
BFICUS is a positive sign that financial markets are back on very solid
ground, and overall financial conditions in the US money, bond and
equity markets have returned to the strength and stability of the
pre-recession period – and those strong financial conditions are
supporting record-high stock market levels.
Update: The weekly Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)
is a composite index based on 100 different financial indicators, and
has proven to be a highly accurate leading indicator of financial stress
at horizons of up to one year. Increasing risk, tighter credit
conditions, and declining leverage are consistent with tightening
financial conditions and produce positive values for the NFCI, while
negative values indicate the opposite conditions. The NFCI fell to -0.87
last week, which is the lowest reading (strongest financial conditions)
since the second week of February 2007, providing additional
statistical evidence that financial conditions in the US have returned
to pre-recession levels.
Oct 14, 2013
Everything You Need To Know About Janet Yellen
By Evan Schnidman
When the internet erupted with commentary about President Obama's official selection of Janet Yellen to be the next Fed Chair, I deliberately decided to write about the largely overlooked FOMC minutes
released an hour before the President's press conference. Now that a
few days have passed, I am going to distill down the important points
about Dr. Yellen's appointment.
Personality
Although
this is not usually touted as a key trait for a leader of a
technocratic organization, I suspect Dr. Yellen's personality and
notoriously diligent work ethic (in economic circles she if often
referred to as a "rigorous thinker") will play a key role in her
leadership style. Writing specifically about her humility, University of
Michigan economics Professor Justin Wolfers said:
I remember being a visiting scholar at the San Francisco Fed when she was president of the bank. Typically, Fed presidents remain safely cloistered in the executive offices, away from the great unwashed. Not Janet. It wasn't unusual to see her in the cafeteria, tray in hand, looking for a table of friendly economists to join. She had an enviable ability to make even the most junior staffers feel at ease and valued.
I
suspect this humility will not only allow Dr. Yellen to relate to the
common man affected by Fed policy, but also to her staff and colleagues
on the Board.
Leadership Style
Aside from
the personality traits that will undoubtedly impact her leadership
style, the two most important leadership traits Dr. Yellen possesses are
her skills as a consensus builder and her willingness to embrace
conflict when necessary. Both of these skills contrast from Chairman
Bernanke, although he has proven himself to be a reasonably good
consensus builder.
Writing specifically about her consensus building skills, Bloomberg News stated:
In spite of her identification as a leading dove, Yellen has shown an ability to forge consensus with the more hawkish, anti-inflation members of the Federal Open Market Committee -- a quality that could come in handy as the central bank wrestles with when and how to unwind all the stimulus it has pumped into the economy.
This
statement was followed by the observation that Yellen has gone out of
her way to meet with Fed district bank presidents on a number of
occasions.
Yellen's calendars, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, show more than 90 meetings by phone or in person with Fed district bank presidents in 2011 and 2012, when she visited the Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Cleveland, Chicago, Minneapolis and San Francisco.
While
Dr. Yellen's consensus building skills have been reasonably well
reported for several months, the more interesting point about her
leadership style is undoubtedly her assertiveness, as reported by The New York Times:
Ms. Yellen is also a more assertive leader than Mr. Bernanke and appears less averse to conflict. While both encourage open debate and seek to make decisions by consensus, Ms. Yellen has been a more vocal and persistent advocate for her own views. Mr. Bernanke has allowed Fed officials to air their views freely, while Ms. Yellen has expressed concern that the cacophony undermines the Fed's effectiveness by sowing confusion about the direction of policy.
The New York Times article went on to explain Dr. Yellen's willingness to challenge the Maestro himself, Alan Greenspan:
Ms. Yellen was the rare Fed official to challenge Mr. Greenspan and succeed. In 1996, she marshaled academic research, including a paper she had encouraged Mr. Akerlof to write, to argue that the Fed should seek to moderate inflation rather than eliminate it. The research showed that a little inflation helped to minimize unemployment. Employers that were reluctant to impose wage cuts could instead allow inflation to erode the real value of wages, allowing them to reduce labor costs.
The Times article continued by pointing to Yellen's role in building internal support for the explicit 2% inflation target (a move with which I disagree).
Perhaps more important, the article also quoted Peter Orzag referencing
Dr. Yellen's "rigorous" thought process in a veiled reference to Brad
Delong's point that Dr. Yellen would be an excellent Fed Chair in normal
circumstances, but perhaps not as good in a crisis where creative
policy decisions must be made quickly. Orzag said:
I could see why people believe she's particularly good at situations in which there are important decisions to be made that involve pulling facts and weighing consequences carefully without pulling the trigger right away.
Policy Focus
Stepping
away from the personality and leadership traits of Dr. Yellen into the
more important policy issues. One thing is very clear about how a Yellen
Chairmanship will unfold: communication is key. As Tim Duy systematically evaluated,
the Fed's existing communication policy is confusing and lacking
strategic vision; it needs improvement. Given that Dr. Yellen has been
the head of the communication subcommittee at the Federal Reserve Board
for the last couple years, she certainly knows more about the existing strategy
than anyone else and has played a bigger role in expanding
communication over the last couple years than basically any other
individual in Fed history. However, that does not mean she is the best
person to improve the Fed's communication strategy.
In recent months she has been in almost open dispute with Fed Board member Jeremy Stein who has suggested
that communication can have a magnified effect and thus induce market
volatility in the form of wider rate spreads. This led Stein to advocate for tapering
the Fed's asset purchases sooner as opposed to later. Although the
Yellen camp obviously won this argument at the September FOMC meeting
(with Stein also voting to sustain the current pace of asset purchases),
the market (over)reaction to talk of tapering and the ensuing dispute
between Yellen and Stein highlights the need to more tightly manage Fed
communication.
Perhaps Dr. Yellen's more "assertive" leadership
style (than Chairman Bernanke) will serve her well in managing
communication, but it is also important to note that modern Fed
communication is more complex than ever before. For instance, in
highlighting the difficulty in managing forward guidance, Felix Salmon writes:
…it's one thing for a Fed chairman to rally his FOMC troops and get them all to agree on a certain course of action at a certain meeting. It's another thing entirely to try to get those troops to agree to a future course of action, stretching out as far as mid-2015, despite the fact that no one really knows what the economy is going to look like then.
Salmon
suggests that Yellen manage the cacophony not by squelching out
dissenting voices, but by embracing them. He suggests that Dr. Yellen
make it clearer than ever before that FOMC members disagree, but that
policy is going in a particular direction based on committee consensus.
While I like this strategy in theory, I think it would be very hard to
manage in practice and runs the risk of diminishing Fed credibility the
way the Supreme Court has diminished their own with so many 5-4
decisions. It is far more likely that as Chairman, Janet Yellen will
limit communicators to stay on point in an effort to provide a clear
signal about monetary policy.
Global Market Response
Thus far the global market response to the Yellen nomination has been pretty subdued. Developing markets responded favorably
to the prospect of continued stimulus, but with a little trepidation
about the possibility of a weaker dollar. Perhaps more important is the
unrelated economic event of two of America's biggest trade partners,
Europe and China, signing a currency swap deal.
This marks a major step toward the Chinese Yuan becoming a global
reserve currency. Although the timing is largely coincident with the
Yellen nomination, this move is likely associated with perceived global
weakness in the stability of the dollar due to the impending debt
ceiling breach. It will be Chairman Yellen's job to ensure that the
dollar remains a global reserve currency, despite the fiscal and
monetary ramifications of strife between the Legislative and Executive
branches.
Aside from the long term prospect of managing the dollar
abroad, Dr. Yellen has already had an enormous impact on global central
banking. In India, new central banker Raghuram Rajan has already
followed Dr. Yellen's steps with an implicit inflation target.
Similarly, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has pursued an
aggressive communication policy, similar to the one Dr. Yellen has
advocated since rejoining the Fed in 2010. Perhaps the only dismissal of
Dr. Yellen's policy proclivities comes from Chairman Bernanke's
graduate school adviser and former head of the Bank of Israel, Stanley
Fischer. Dr. Fischer has suggested
that forward guidance and the plethora of other new communication
policies confuse markets and run the risk of diminishing central bank
credibility. While I do not expect this view to sway Dr. Yellen, it is
worth revisiting to see if she at least manages the forward guidance
strategy more precisely.
Hawk or Dove?
While
the media narrative has consistently categorized Dr. Yellen as a dove, I
think this is not completely fair. In the 1990s she expressed hawkish
inflation views about the dangers of asset bubbles, and although slow to
repeat these concerns in the 2000s, she was still ahead of the curve in
spotting the crisis on the horizon. Perhaps more important than her
individual past is the history of other Fed Chairmen. Specifically, new Fed Chairs have historically been quick to raise interest rates
and tighten policy in order to establish their credibility as an
inflation fighting central banker. To be fair, economic cycles have lent
themselves to this pattern, but the pressure to establish credibility
is definitely there. Nevertheless, I suspect the pressure on Dr. Yellen
will be more towards generating continued job growth since inflation
remains low and stable and her challenge appears to be persistently high
unemployment.
Conclusion
Will all of the
commentary, anecdotes and other information available about Janet
Yellen, I think it is exceedingly unlikely that markets will be
surprised by her leadership style or policy outcomes. So, investors and
traders should expect an extension of the Bernanke years in terms of
loose policy designed to stimulate job growth, but investors might also
be pleasantly surprised (and traders slightly dismayed) by a tighter and
more carefully managed communication strategy that avoids undue market
confusion and increased volatility.
A testament to the resilience of markets: World stock market capitalization is nearly back to pre-recession, pre-crisis levels
By Carpe Diem
The
Paris-based World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), an association of 58
publicly regulated stock market exchanges around the world, recently released updated data
on its monthly measure of the total market capitalization of the
world’s major equity markets through the end of September. Here are some
highlights:
- As of the end of September, the total value of world equities in those 58 major stock markets reached $60.7 trillion, the highest monthly world stock market capitalization since October 2007, several months before the global economic slowdown and financial crisis started and caused global equity values to fall by more than 50% and by almost $34 trillion (see chart above).
- The total value of global equities increased by $3.3 trillion from August to September, which is the sixth largest monthly gain in world equity values in the history of WFE data back to 1995.
- Compared to a year earlier, September’s world stock market capitalization increased by 14.8%, led by a 18.6% gain in the Europe-Africa-Middle East region, followed by gains of 13.6% in the Americas and 13.1% in the Asia-Pacific region.
- By individual country, the largest year-over-year gains were recorded in Greece (117%), Argentina (58%), Ireland (41%) and Japan (31%). In the US, the NYSE capitalization increased by 20.4% and the NASDAQ by 15.3%. The biggest losses in equity value over the last year were posted in India (-19%), Peru (-18.2%) and Egypt (-17.9%).
- The September world stock market capitalization of $60.7 trillion was the second highest level in history and was just 3.3% below the pre-recession peak, and all-time record high of $62.8 trillion of global equity values in October 2007
Oct 3, 2013
An Honest Letter from the Chairman of General Motors
By Porter Stansberry |
Wednesday, October 2, 2013 |
Dear shareholders,
Moody's Investors Service recently upgraded General Motors' rating.
The major credit-rating agency bumped our rating from Ba1 to Baa3 – its lowest tier of "investment grade" credit.
Nobody was more surprised than me. Let me tell you plainly, I do not believe our company is an investment-grade credit. Nor are our operations likely to improve in a way that would have led any reasonable analyst to conclude such. That is why all of the other major ratings houses (S&P, Fitch, Egan Jones) continue to rate our corporate obligations as "junk" – speculative debts that have a significant risk of default.
I now understand what Bill Gross means when he says investors shouldn't trust Moody's ratings because the company has become a de facto arm of the U.S. government. Or as he put it recently: Moody's and the U.S. Treasury are just one big "happy family."
Gross manages hundreds of billions of dollars in private capital for the investment management firm PIMCO. So he has the luxury of being able to say whatever he wants in public.
I don't have that luxury. I'm the chairman of a publicly owned corporation, whose debts are soaring, whose margins are collapsing, and whose capital structure is still controlled by the government and our unions. So when the reporters called me to ask about the Moody's upgrade, I said: "Good things happen when you build great cars and trucks and deliver strong financial results."
It's a great line. It still makes me chuckle.
Read it carefully. You'll notice… I didn't say anything about GM.
What I couldn't say is that our business is already beginning to collapse, again. Look at our core automotive operating profits. In the first six months of 2012, we generated $2.8 billion in automotive operating profits. In the first six months of this year, we made a little more than $2.1 billion. Thus, our core, global automotive business has seen its operating profits decline substantially… by more than 24%.
We are approaching another crisis at GM, one that has its roots in the bailout of 2008/2009. The faulty bankruptcy process caused this crisis by failing to address our largest obligations (pensions and retired employee health care). And the crisis results from the motivations of our government owners – motivations that do not square with capitalism.
Like my predecessor, Rick Wagoner, did… I plan to write to you from time to time, privately, here in these pages. I will tell you what is actually happening with our great company – an institution that was once the largest privately financed endeavor in human history. You'll get the truth here, even if I'm not allowed to say it anywhere else…
What's happening with GM is a microcosm of what's happening with the rest of our society. Where once we sought only a fair opportunity for greatness, now we seek the false security of collectivism. I see it happening right in front of me every day.
I believe an honest discussion of what's happening with our business could help educate the public about the failure that's inevitable when resources – like our capital, plants, and people – are governed by politics rather than by markets.
At GM, we abandoned capitalism in 2010 when we emerged from bankruptcy. Instead of treating all of our creditors fairly, we gave the lion's share of the company's assets to the federal government and the UAW health care trust. Meanwhile, we didn't do anything to mitigate our enormous pension liability, which today stands at $26 billion. At the end of the bankruptcy process, none of our 400,000 retired workers lost a nickel. On the other hand, our shareholders, creditors, and many of our suppliers were wiped out.
That's not the way capitalism is supposed to work. And still today, GM isn't really privately owned. Instead, the company is a kind of public-private "partnership," where actual control rests with the government. Today, GM is more like a Ponzi scheme than a real business.
How so? Ponzi schemes don't generate any actual profits. They require greater and greater sums of money to work. Sooner or later, there simply isn't enough capital available to maintain the mirage of a functioning business. That's exactly what's happening at GM.
Don't take my word for it. Consider the facts below. Then, decide for yourself.
Is GM a real business, owned by capitalists, driven to create real profits, to be shared by its owners as they see fit? Or is it a kind of elaborate, government-sanctioned scheme, meant to enrich a few chosen, special interests?
Moody's Investors Service recently upgraded General Motors' rating.
The major credit-rating agency bumped our rating from Ba1 to Baa3 – its lowest tier of "investment grade" credit.
Nobody was more surprised than me. Let me tell you plainly, I do not believe our company is an investment-grade credit. Nor are our operations likely to improve in a way that would have led any reasonable analyst to conclude such. That is why all of the other major ratings houses (S&P, Fitch, Egan Jones) continue to rate our corporate obligations as "junk" – speculative debts that have a significant risk of default.
I now understand what Bill Gross means when he says investors shouldn't trust Moody's ratings because the company has become a de facto arm of the U.S. government. Or as he put it recently: Moody's and the U.S. Treasury are just one big "happy family."
Gross manages hundreds of billions of dollars in private capital for the investment management firm PIMCO. So he has the luxury of being able to say whatever he wants in public.
I don't have that luxury. I'm the chairman of a publicly owned corporation, whose debts are soaring, whose margins are collapsing, and whose capital structure is still controlled by the government and our unions. So when the reporters called me to ask about the Moody's upgrade, I said: "Good things happen when you build great cars and trucks and deliver strong financial results."
It's a great line. It still makes me chuckle.
Read it carefully. You'll notice… I didn't say anything about GM.
What I couldn't say is that our business is already beginning to collapse, again. Look at our core automotive operating profits. In the first six months of 2012, we generated $2.8 billion in automotive operating profits. In the first six months of this year, we made a little more than $2.1 billion. Thus, our core, global automotive business has seen its operating profits decline substantially… by more than 24%.
We are approaching another crisis at GM, one that has its roots in the bailout of 2008/2009. The faulty bankruptcy process caused this crisis by failing to address our largest obligations (pensions and retired employee health care). And the crisis results from the motivations of our government owners – motivations that do not square with capitalism.
Like my predecessor, Rick Wagoner, did… I plan to write to you from time to time, privately, here in these pages. I will tell you what is actually happening with our great company – an institution that was once the largest privately financed endeavor in human history. You'll get the truth here, even if I'm not allowed to say it anywhere else…
What's happening with GM is a microcosm of what's happening with the rest of our society. Where once we sought only a fair opportunity for greatness, now we seek the false security of collectivism. I see it happening right in front of me every day.
I believe an honest discussion of what's happening with our business could help educate the public about the failure that's inevitable when resources – like our capital, plants, and people – are governed by politics rather than by markets.
At GM, we abandoned capitalism in 2010 when we emerged from bankruptcy. Instead of treating all of our creditors fairly, we gave the lion's share of the company's assets to the federal government and the UAW health care trust. Meanwhile, we didn't do anything to mitigate our enormous pension liability, which today stands at $26 billion. At the end of the bankruptcy process, none of our 400,000 retired workers lost a nickel. On the other hand, our shareholders, creditors, and many of our suppliers were wiped out.
That's not the way capitalism is supposed to work. And still today, GM isn't really privately owned. Instead, the company is a kind of public-private "partnership," where actual control rests with the government. Today, GM is more like a Ponzi scheme than a real business.
How so? Ponzi schemes don't generate any actual profits. They require greater and greater sums of money to work. Sooner or later, there simply isn't enough capital available to maintain the mirage of a functioning business. That's exactly what's happening at GM.
Don't take my word for it. Consider the facts below. Then, decide for yourself.
Is GM a real business, owned by capitalists, driven to create real profits, to be shared by its owners as they see fit? Or is it a kind of elaborate, government-sanctioned scheme, meant to enrich a few chosen, special interests?
Since GM emerged from bankruptcy protection in mid-2010… we've done great.
The last few years are the best years in the history of our company. We've never built better cars. The market research firm JD Power says GM has the highest-quality cars of any major carmaker. Our trucks, it says, compete with Porsche for the highest-quality vehicles made anywhere in the world. We've never generated more revenue. In total, we've made about $26 billion in operating cash flow – what our main business generated before paying capital expenses and similar costs – since we emerged from bankruptcy.
It all sounds good, I know.
The bad news is that our business requires massive amounts of capital to sustain its operations. These so-called capital expenditures consumed roughly $20 billion of those operating profits. That left us with roughly $6 billion-$7 billion in actual cash that we could, in theory, return to our true owners (our shareholders) or re-invest into profitable lines of business.
So where did this money – the so-called free cash flow – go?
All the money – and a lot more – went to retired workers, unions, and the government.
In total, we've sent around $18 billion in cash to these interests – far more than we've been able to earn. These payments started with $3.9 billion in dividends on special "preferred" shares the union, the U.S. Treasury, and the Canadian government got during the bankruptcy process. Keep in mind, our creditors got none of these shares, and we've never paid a cash dividend to regular, common stockholders.
Another $8.5 billion went to repay debts to the U.S. Treasury and the union, obligations that we were saddled with in bankruptcy.
And that's not all. In 2012, we announced with great fanfare that our operating results were so good, we were going to begin buying back shares. Normally, that's great for common shareholders.
But in this case, the $5.1 billion worth of stock we bought back ALL came from the U.S. Treasury. No former creditor or any other public shareholder was able to sell to us. That's not all… We paid a $2-per-share premium to the actual market price of our stock. We simply gave the U.S. Treasury another $400 million "gift" for allowing us to buy back the shares it held.
Remember… private investors didn't have a chance to sell their shares to GM at a $2 premium. That deal was nothing less than a crime. It was the U.S. Treasury stealing $400 million from the shareholders. If any other business in the country did something like this, it would get hit with a hundred lawsuits overnight. But when GM did it? The press cheered. How can you explain that?
So we continue to owe far more to unions and governments than we're earning. If that were our only problem, perhaps we could envision a light at the end of the tunnel. But these obligations are only the beginning…
That $26 billion in operating cash flow already accounted for about $8.8 billion in cash payments we made to support our pension plan and other retirement benefits. Without those obligations… our number would have looked even better, with operating cash flow of nearly $35 billion. That anchor around our neck isn't going anywhere.
In addition to the cash, we contributed in 2011 60 million shares of stock (worth $2 billion) to the pension plan. No, that wasn't a cash expense. But believe me, shareholders should wish it was, as the expense will end up coming out of their pockets, instead of ours.
Just think about what that means…
Instead of the workers supporting the shareholders… at GM, the shareholders are supporting the workers. Sounds a little bit like communism, doesn't it? Well, just wait. The nonsense is only getting started…
In 2012, we announced a big deal to eliminate our entire legacy, white-collar-salary pension obligations. We paid the Prudential insurance firm around $3.5 billion to manage $25 billion worth of our pension liabilities, taking them off our books. Don't forget… we also gave Prudential $25 billion from the pension fund to manage.
Think about that for a little while. When is the last time you had to pay your broker 14% of your assets upfront to manage your account? Hedge funds normally charge 2%. They're considered expensive. Paying 14% sounds a little steep, doesn't it? No one ever explained it to me, either. My guess is a lot of that fee ended up in union offices or political piggy banks.
Whatever happened, all of the money is gone. In the three years after bankruptcy, we made roughly $6 billion-$7 billion in "free cash flow." Somehow, that cash was supposed to cover $18 billion in obligations… including almost $1 billion a year in preferred-stock dividends to the union's health care trust and the Canadian government. That also includes the $400 million "gift" to the U.S. Treasury and the $5.1 billion worth of shares we bought from it.
And for our common shareholders, our real owners? We haven't paid a cent.
So who really benefits from our brands… our research and development… our decades of investment… and the tens of billions of capital we have at stake? Is it our shareholders? No, it isn't. It's the union. It's the retired workers. And it's the government.
Is any of this likely to change any time soon? No, it's going to get worse… a lot worse.
Look at our preferred shares. They were created to make sure the union got most of the value out of our remaining assets. (Our bondholders didn't get any of these preferred shares.) The shares pay a 9% annual dividend. Try to find any other preferred stock issued by a major corporation that pays a coupon that large. You won't find another example.
We were simply hijacked by the bankruptcy court and the Obama administration. And we have to pay this dividend before we pay anything else. If we don't, these obligations accrue, a situation that would rapidly warp our entire capital structure, placing the whole company in the union's control.
So one of my most important jobs is to buy back these securities as quickly as I can. The problem is, they're extremely expensive. I've just negotiated a deal to buy back 120 million preferred shares at $27 each from the union's medical trust. That's $3.25 billion. Believe it or not, the medical trust will still own 140 million of these preferred shares. The Canadian government also owns a few of these shares (16 million). We can redeem all of these remaining shares in 2014, but it will cost us almost $4 billion – in cash.
To pay off the union then, we'll have to borrow money… billions.
Now, you know the real reason why Moody's just raised our credit ratings. I'm sure the government told Moody's to help GM raise the money so we can pay off the unions.
Shall I feign indignation that the country's most politically powerful union is able to manipulate Moody's credit ratings?
I'm proud of GM's cars.
As I mentioned, we've made huge strides in increasing the quality of our vehicles. But guess what? So has every other carmaker in the world. The competition makes it harder and harder to make a profit.
Just look at our actual numbers. In the first six months of 2012, we sold $74.5 billion worth of cars around the world (automotive revenues). We made an operating profit of $2.8 billion. That's a minuscule operating profit margin of 3.8%.
The situation is getting worse. In first half of 2013, we sold $74.6 billion worth of cars around the world, fractionally more revenue. But we earned a lot less, only $2.1 billion. Our costs rose, and we could not pass these costs on to our customers. Our operating margin declined to less than 3%.
These are razor-thin margins. Margins this small are dangerous to operating companies, like ours, that have huge volumes. If anything were to happen to consumer demand – for example, if the economy were hit with a recession or we were unable to finance our customers (more about this below) – these puny margins would disappear overnight. The result would be sudden, large losses.
You should know: An "accident" like this is inevitable. It's going to happen. And it's going to happen soon. The auto industry suffers from a tremendous glut of capacity. According to different sources, 20%-30% of global production isn't profitable.
My counterpart at Nissan, Carlos Ghosn, is one of the few senior executives who has spoken honestly about this major problem. At a recent car show in Geneva, he said, "All of the car manufacturers have capacity problems – all of them."
Sergio Marchionne, the chief executive of Chrysler and Fiat and the president of the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association, estimates the auto industry needs to cut capacity in Europe by 20%.
Automakers employ or support 2.3 million people in Europe. Just like in the United States, the auto industry is too politically powerful to be allowed to fail. It's the same thing, all around the globe. So how likely is it that any automaker, anywhere, will be able to significantly reduce production?
Capitalists making tough, but realistic, decisions no longer control this industry. Instead all of the capital-allocation decisions are being driven by politics. Whether you call it "welfare," "socialism," or "communism" doesn't matter. As long as this continues, it's inevitable that GM's operating margins will continue to deteriorate. And that means, it's only a matter of time before we're dealing with huge quarterly losses.
Bernd Bohr is the head of the automotive group at Bosch, the privately held German company that's the world's largest manufacturer of car parts. He explains the current problems by pointing out that none of the major carmakers was allowed to fail in 2008/2009. "It was a peculiarity of the 2008-09 crisis," Bohr said, "that practically no capacity was taken out of the market due to state intervention…"
While hard to fix, the problem is easy to understand. As long as no carmakers are allowed to fail, the ability of the entire industry to earn a profit will be greatly compromised. GM is the largest car company in the world (roughly tied with Toyota). It has the highest labor costs. It is heavily burdened by its pension obligations. It has, despite my best efforts, several weak brands.
In this scenario, GM is extremely vulnerable, the most vulnerable large carmaker in the world.
My advice? Don't pay attention to our revenue figures. Watch our margins. It's overcapacity that will kill us this time, not quality or a lack of demand.
Think about the dead-end GM faces strategically.
We can't compete on brand. No one under 40 years old would rather drive a Cadillac than a BMW. Almost no one at any age would rather have a Chevy Malibu than a Honda Accord. And even though our trucks are great, Ford's are just as good (if I'm being honest).
We can't compete on price because we don't have the cheapest costs. Instead, we have the highest.
And no matter how much money we make, all of it (and more) will end up being siphoned off to either the union's health care trust or the pension fund.
What would you do in this scenario?
I've thought about this question every single day for three years. There's only one answer. And it's a lousy one.
GM will have to compete on credit. We'll have to work out a deal with Wall Street to borrow billions and billions and funnel the money to car buyers who the other makers won't lend to. Our only chance is to, once again, become too big to fail.
In the fall of 2010, we acquired a financial business, now called GM Financial. It exists to provide financing to buyers of our cars in dealer showrooms. You might recall that our company's last foray into finance didn't end well… huge losses at our former finance subsidiary were one of the primary reasons our company spiraled into bankruptcy back in 2008.
We're doing it all again.
As our margins have declined, we've attempted to grow by making more and more loans. Our loan book has ballooned to $11.5 billion. We made about 75% of these loans to borrowers with FICO scores lower than 600. Unbelievably, we're even lending billions (more than $3 billion, actually) to folks with FICO scores less than 540.
It seems implausible to me that these loans will work out for us in the end. By the end of 2012, nearly $1 billion of these loans was already in default. Just imagine what will happen to these weak borrowers when we eventually enter another recession. Just as our sales are declining, all of these bad debts will come due. All the repossessed cars will flood the market, driving down recovery values and destroying demand for new cars.
Haven't we learned anything from the last financial crisis? Apparently not.
You will see as we move forward, our margins will continue to decline because of the global problem of overcapacity. Charities – which is what all of the major car companies have become – don't make a profit. As our margins decline and our cash flow disappears, the union and retiree demands on our remaining capital resources will grow more intense. We'll have to borrow more and more simply to fund our pension obligations.
We will also be borrowing, massively, from Wall Street to finance our car buyers.
Sooner or later, we will end up losing money on every transaction, while trying to make it up on volume… and financing that volume using our own balance sheet.
It's insane… unless you understand it's my only hope. I've got to borrow billions and billions over the next few quarters. I've got to scale up, so that we're so big we can't be allowed to fail. It will be the same madness we saw in 2008 all over again.
But this time, it won't take decades to unravel. It will happen much faster. My guess is within five years, we'll be in a crisis again. And our stock, which is currently valued at $50 billion, will be worth nothing.
Please invest accordingly.
Best regards,
The Chairman of General Motors
Sep 10, 2013
Five charts that help put ‘Saudi America’s’ shale revolution into perspective
Article by Carpe Diem
1. The Department of Energy reported yesterday
that US oil production for the week ending August 30 averaged 7.62
million barrels per day (bpd), which is the highest weekly output of
crude oil in the US since October 1989 (see chart above). Over just the
last two years since August 2011, US oil output has increased by 2
million bpd. That increase is almost exclusively because of increases in
domestic shale oil production in states like North Dakota and Texas,
and that shale oil surge has completely reversed a multi-decade decline
in US oil output and brought domestic crude oil production to the
highest level in almost 24 years.
2. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) released new data this week
on international energy production for the month of May. For the
seventh consecutive month starting last November, “Saudi America” was
again the No. 1 petroleum producer in the world in May, and the US produced more petroleum products (crude
oil and other petroleum products like natural gas plant liquids, leased
condensate, and refined petroleum products) at 12.06 million barrels
per day (bpd) than No. 2 Saudi Arabia at 11.53 million bpd (see chart
above). Starting in around 2009, revolutionary drilling technologies
started accessing oceans of shale resources in America, which launched
the US to become the world’s No. 1 petroleum producer by the end of
2012.
3. Mostly as a result of increased production of domestic shale oil and gas, America produced more than 90% of all energy consumed during the month of May according to data released recently by the EIA. The last time the US was more than 90% “energy self-sufficient” in any single month was in September 1987, almost 26 years ago (see chart above).
4. Thanks to the abundance of domestic shale gas resources that have recently become available because of advanced drilling technologies (hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling), natural gas prices have fallen to historic low levels. The chart above shows natural gas prices adjusted to the energy equivalent of one barrel of oil based on a price ratio of 5.8-to-1 (one barrel of crude oil has 5.8 times as much energy content as one million BTUs of natural gas), on a monthly basis back to January 1994. For example, at the current price of $3.43 for one million BTUs of natural gas, gas would cost $19.89 for an amount of energy equivalent to one barrel of oil, which is currently priced at $108.67 per barrel.
5. The chart below shows the monthly percentage difference between the price of natural gas and crude oil, on an energy equivalent basis, back to January 1994. Thanks to the abundance of shale gas, natural gas is currently almost 82% cheaper than oil, adjusted for energy equivalence. The increased affordability of natural gas at historic levels, especially when compared to the price of oil, has provided significant economic and environmental benefits to the US economy including: a) lower energy costs for residential, commercial and industrial consumers that have generated billions of dollars in savings, b) increased competitiveness for energy-intensive US manufacturing that has contributed to an American manufacturing renaissance, and c) a reduction in CO2 emissions to an 18-year low in 2012 for total emissions, and to almost a 50-year low on a per-capita basis.
Bottom Line:
The five charts above provide graphical evidence that America’s shale
energy revolution is taking us from “resource scarcity” to a new era of
“resource abundance” as the US was able to produce 90% of its own energy
in May and has produced more petroleum products than Saudi Arabia in
every month since last November. This energy bonanza in the US —
described as the “energy equivalent of the Berlin Wall coming down” —
would have been largely unthinkable even five years ago. But then thanks
to revolutionary drilling techniques developed by America’s
“petropreneurs,” we’ve unlocked vast oceans of shale oil and gas across
the US and are now the world’s No. 1 producer of petroleum for seven
months running. Welcome to America’s amazing shale revolution.
Sep 5, 2013
Recent reports show some signs of economic strength in US housing, manufacturing and car sales, and Europe
Source Article: Carpe Diem
There have been a lot of positive economic reports released recently, here are six:
- US cars sales in August rose to 16.02 million units on a seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) basis, which was the best sales month since November 2007, the month before the recession started (see chart above). For the month of August, sales this year were just slightly behind sales in 2007 (16.03 million) and ahead of sales in 2006 (15.9 million). As the chart above shows, US car sales have now made a complete recovery from the effects of the 2007-2009 recession, and have rebounded by 7 million units on a SAAR basis from a cyclical low of 9.02 million units in February 2009 to 16.02 million units last month.
- For the weekend ending August 25, the American Staffing Association’s index for temporary and contract employment remained at a level of 97 for the second straight week. That’s the highest level of temporary hiring activity since December 2007. Temporary and contract employment has historically been a leading indicator of future employment trends in the economy, and therefore the increase in the ASA staffing index to 2007 levels is a positive sign that the labor market will continue to improve this year.
- The Conference Board reported last week that its Leading Economic Index for the Euro Area increased 1.0 percent in July, after increasing 0.4 percent in both June and May. “The third consecutive increase in the Euro Area Leading Economic Index signals an improving economic outlook, now that the economy appears to be moving out of recession,” says Bert Colijn, Economist for Europe at The Conference Board.
- Total construction spending in July reached $900.8 billion on a seasonally adjusted annual basis, which was the strongest performance since June 2009 for overall construction spending, and the best performance since September 2008 for residential construction.
- CoreLogic reported this week that US home prices, including distressed sales, increased by 12.4% in July 2013 from a year earlier, marking the 17th consecutive month of year-over-year home price gains and posting the highest annual price gain since February 2006. Looking forward, CoreLogic expects home prices to rise in August by 12.3%.
- The August ISM manufacturing index (PMI), a key measure of manufacturing sentiment nationally, came in at 57.7 and easily beat the consensus expectation of 54.0. It was the highest level of manufacturing activity in more than two years, going back to June 2011. According to the Institute for Supply Management, “The past relationship between the PMI and the overall economy indicates that the average PMI for January through August (52.5%) corresponds to a 3.2% increase in real GDP on an annualized basis. In addition, if the PMI for August (55.7%) is annualized, it corresponds to a 4.2% increase in real GDP annually.”
Aug 2, 2013
Happy 101st birthday, Milton Friedman
by Carpe Diem
Milton Friedman
was born on this day, July 31, in 1912, and he would have been 101
years old today. Unfortunately, Milton died on November 16, 2006 when he
was 94 years old. In an editorial in the Wall Street Journal following
Friedman’s death, they reported his loss with the same tribute Milton
used when Ronald Reagan died, saying “few people in human history have
contributed more to the achievement of human freedom.” In honor of his
legacy and birthday, here are some of my favorite Milton Friedman
quotes:
- There is nothing as permanent as a temporary government program.
- Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.
- Inflation is caused by too much money chasing after too few goods.
- Sloppy writing reflects sloppy thinking.
- All learning is ultimately self-learning.
- I’m in favor of legalizing drugs. According to my values system, if people want to kill themselves, they have every right to do so. Most of the harm that comes from drugs is because they are illegal.
- Nobody spends somebody else’s money as carefully as he spends his own. Nobody uses somebody else’s resources as carefully as he uses his own. So if you want efficiency and effectiveness, if you want knowledge to be properly utilized, you have to do it through the means of private property.
- The government solution to a problem is usually as bad as the problem.
- The Great Depression, like most other periods of severe unemployment, was produced by government mismanagement rather than by any inherent instability of the private economy.
- The high rate of unemployment among teenagers, and especially black teenagers, is both a scandal and a serious source of social unrest. Yet it is largely a result of minimum wage laws. We regard the minimum wage law as one of the most, if not the most, anti-black laws on the statute books.
- Industrial progress, mechanical improvement, all of the great wonders of the modern era have meant relatively little to the wealthy. The rich in Ancient Greece would have benefited hardly at all from modern plumbing: running servants replaced running water. Television and radio? The patricians of Rome could enjoy the leading musicians and actors in their home, could have the leading actors as domestic retainers. Ready-to-wear clothing, supermarkets — all these and many other modern developments would have added little to their life. The great achievements of Western capitalism have redounded primarily to the benefit of the ordinary person. These achievements have made available to the masses conveniences and amenities that were previously the exclusive prerogative of the rich and powerful.
- President Kennedy said, “Ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country.”… Neither half of that statement expresses a relation between the citizen and his government that is worthy of the ideals of free men in a free society. “What your country can do for you” implies that the government is the patron, the citizen the ward. “What you can do for your country” assumes that the government is the master, the citizen the servant.
- On the difference between public vs. private education: “Try talking French with someone who studied it in public school. Then with a Berlitz graduate.”
Shale revolution: ‘Saudi America’ was the world’s No. 1 petroleum producer in April for the 6th straight month
by Carpe Diem
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) released new data
this week on international energy production for the month of April.
For the sixth straight month starting in November last year, total
petroleum production (crude oil and other petroleum products like
natural gas plant liquids, leased condensate, and refined petroleum
products) in “Saudi America” during the month of April (12.08 million
barrels per day) exceeded petroleum production in Saudi Arabia (11.53
million barrels per day). Also for the sixth month in a row starting
last November, “Saudi America”: a) took the top spot as the No. 1
petroleum producer in the world, and b) produced more petroleum than the
combined output of all of the countries in Europe, Central America, and
South America (11.46 million barrels per day).
This is more evidence that
America’s shale energy revolution is taking us from “resource scarcity”
to a new era of “resource abundance” as the US now consistently produces
more petroleum products than Saudi Arabia, has led the world in
petroleum production for six straight months, and has produced more
petroleum than all of the countries in Europe, Central America, and
South America combined for six straight months. This energy bonanza in
the US — described as the “energy equivalent of the Berlin Wall coming
down” — would have been largely unthinkable even five years ago. But
then thanks to revolutionary drilling techniques developed by America’s
“petropreneurs” like George P. Mitchell,
we’ve unlocked vast oceans of shale oil and gas across the US and are
now the world’s No. 1 producer of petroleum for six months running.
Welcome to America’s shale revolution. Carpe oleum.
May 3, 2013
What's the Best Way to Value Berkshire?
Given its complexity, as well as the size and diversity of its businesses, valuing Berkshire Hathaway is unquestionably a challenge. The most commonly cited methods for valuing the company's shares include the use of an earnings-based multiple, a book-value-based multiple, a two-column approach, a float-based methodology, and, finally, a discounted cash flow valuation. In some cases, investors will use a combination of these different methodologies to value different parts of the business, or as a way to triangulate their own estimates.
We believe that understanding the benefits and shortfalls of each of
these methodologies can provide valuable insight into the ways in which
different investors are approaching the firm's overall valuation. It
also provides us with an opportunity to expand on our own discounted
cash flow valuation, which we feel provides a more robust and reliable
valuation than any of the other shortcut or alternative methods in use
today.
Ahead of the annual meeting, we thought we would take an in-depth look at pros and cons of each of the most popular ways to value the company.
An earnings-based multiple is too simplistic and misses aspects of Berkshire's value
While a price/earnings-based multiple may work well when comparing similar companies in the same industry, there are no real comparable firms for Berkshire, which is basically a large collection of disparate companies operating independently of each other, making it difficult to determine which multiple would best reflect a fair price for the firm overall. Not only do we believe that a simple earnings multiple can lead investors astray because of the complexity and diversity of Berkshire's operations, but also some special difficulties exist with insurance company earnings, including the fact that they do not adequately capture the value of the firm's investments.
The table below highlights the price/earnings multiples as well as the multiples of our analysts' fair value estimates relative to their earnings estimates, for some of the publicly traded peer companies for Berkshire's main operating segments. We illustrate the diversity of Berkshire's operations and the difficulty of assigning good comparisons to the firm's disparate businesses (with the multiples across the different business lines varying fairly widely).
In order to apply these price/earnings multiples to come up with a value for Berkshire overall we need to break down the firm's pretax earnings by their different sources, as shown in the chart 3:
By combining this breakdown of Berkshire's pretax earnings by source with our fair value/earnings multiples (or with the price/earnings multiples in cases where a firm is not covered by a Morningstar analyst) we can produce a theoretical earnings-based multiple for the company, as shown below.
Notably, the multiple implied by this exercise is significantly lower than what we believe is a fair price for the company.
There are a few issues that can cause Berkshire's reported results to not reflect the full economic value of the company and therefore limit the usefulness of an earnings-based multiple approach. Most notably, annual earnings do not adequately reflect the full value of the company's equity investments (and to address this, some practitioners have suggested including "look-through earnings" to the valuation, an approach we will discuss later). On top of that, using an earnings multiple to value an insurance company has its own limitations, which we discuss in further detail below. Although Berkshire no longer derives as large a percentage of its profits from insurance as it once did, it still represents more than half of the value of the company, based on our analysis.
Annual earnings for insurance companies can be subject to significant volatility, which makes applying an earnings multiple a more difficult exercise. Insurance companies, and reinsurers in particular, are often subject to volatile claims that can cause earnings to fluctuate substantially from year to year. A hurricane loss or other significant storm could effectively wipe out an insurer's annual profits, while a year without major catastrophes could lead to abnormally high profitability. Berkshire's large reinsurance operations, concentrated in General Re and Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group (BHRG), have significant exposure to large catastrophe and super catastrophe risks. Further, realized gains and losses on investments in Berkshire's insurance portfolios flow through the income statement, potentially distorting annual profitability. As such, it is not surprising to see a fairly wide spread in P/E multiples among the insurance peers listed in the comparison table above.
To address some of the shortfalls inherent in a simple earnings-based multiple, some investors have suggested incorporating "look-through earnings," which gives Berkshire credit for its proportional share of the earnings from the companies in its equity portfolio, into the process. Using this approach gets us closer to what we believe is a true value for Berkshire, but misses the mark slightly, as shown in the table below.
The differential of this approach from our fair value estimate may be due to a few factors. Most notably, the multiple we apply is the one derived from the proportional weightings of Berkshire's operating businesses. Due to the inclusion of financial businesses and certain high capital-intensity operations in the weighting, the multiple that gets assigned to Berkshire's subsidiaries is likely to be lower than the one that investors would assign to the firm's equity investments. Hence, an adjustment to the multiple may be needed. Additionally, except for the near-zero returns it generates, this method excludes the value of the firm's cash hoard. Another shortfall with this approach is that it treats all equity investments as if they are owned fully by shareholders. In reality (as we will elaborate on when we examine the two-column method), some of the investments are directly backstopping insurance operations that lessen their value to equityholders. There may also be some double counting as we are including some of the dividends earned from these equity investments that are already reflected in the firm's income statement.
Ahead of the annual meeting, we thought we would take an in-depth look at pros and cons of each of the most popular ways to value the company.
An earnings-based multiple is too simplistic and misses aspects of Berkshire's value
While a price/earnings-based multiple may work well when comparing similar companies in the same industry, there are no real comparable firms for Berkshire, which is basically a large collection of disparate companies operating independently of each other, making it difficult to determine which multiple would best reflect a fair price for the firm overall. Not only do we believe that a simple earnings multiple can lead investors astray because of the complexity and diversity of Berkshire's operations, but also some special difficulties exist with insurance company earnings, including the fact that they do not adequately capture the value of the firm's investments.
The table below highlights the price/earnings multiples as well as the multiples of our analysts' fair value estimates relative to their earnings estimates, for some of the publicly traded peer companies for Berkshire's main operating segments. We illustrate the diversity of Berkshire's operations and the difficulty of assigning good comparisons to the firm's disparate businesses (with the multiples across the different business lines varying fairly widely).
In order to apply these price/earnings multiples to come up with a value for Berkshire overall we need to break down the firm's pretax earnings by their different sources, as shown in the chart 3:
By combining this breakdown of Berkshire's pretax earnings by source with our fair value/earnings multiples (or with the price/earnings multiples in cases where a firm is not covered by a Morningstar analyst) we can produce a theoretical earnings-based multiple for the company, as shown below.
Notably, the multiple implied by this exercise is significantly lower than what we believe is a fair price for the company.
There are a few issues that can cause Berkshire's reported results to not reflect the full economic value of the company and therefore limit the usefulness of an earnings-based multiple approach. Most notably, annual earnings do not adequately reflect the full value of the company's equity investments (and to address this, some practitioners have suggested including "look-through earnings" to the valuation, an approach we will discuss later). On top of that, using an earnings multiple to value an insurance company has its own limitations, which we discuss in further detail below. Although Berkshire no longer derives as large a percentage of its profits from insurance as it once did, it still represents more than half of the value of the company, based on our analysis.
Annual earnings for insurance companies can be subject to significant volatility, which makes applying an earnings multiple a more difficult exercise. Insurance companies, and reinsurers in particular, are often subject to volatile claims that can cause earnings to fluctuate substantially from year to year. A hurricane loss or other significant storm could effectively wipe out an insurer's annual profits, while a year without major catastrophes could lead to abnormally high profitability. Berkshire's large reinsurance operations, concentrated in General Re and Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group (BHRG), have significant exposure to large catastrophe and super catastrophe risks. Further, realized gains and losses on investments in Berkshire's insurance portfolios flow through the income statement, potentially distorting annual profitability. As such, it is not surprising to see a fairly wide spread in P/E multiples among the insurance peers listed in the comparison table above.
To address some of the shortfalls inherent in a simple earnings-based multiple, some investors have suggested incorporating "look-through earnings," which gives Berkshire credit for its proportional share of the earnings from the companies in its equity portfolio, into the process. Using this approach gets us closer to what we believe is a true value for Berkshire, but misses the mark slightly, as shown in the table below.
The differential of this approach from our fair value estimate may be due to a few factors. Most notably, the multiple we apply is the one derived from the proportional weightings of Berkshire's operating businesses. Due to the inclusion of financial businesses and certain high capital-intensity operations in the weighting, the multiple that gets assigned to Berkshire's subsidiaries is likely to be lower than the one that investors would assign to the firm's equity investments. Hence, an adjustment to the multiple may be needed. Additionally, except for the near-zero returns it generates, this method excludes the value of the firm's cash hoard. Another shortfall with this approach is that it treats all equity investments as if they are owned fully by shareholders. In reality (as we will elaborate on when we examine the two-column method), some of the investments are directly backstopping insurance operations that lessen their value to equityholders. There may also be some double counting as we are including some of the dividends earned from these equity investments that are already reflected in the firm's income statement.
Mar 20, 2013
Average incomes of the poor now exceed those of the rich 50 years ago.
By Matt Ridley
In my book I point out that an unemployed British father of
three on welfare today receives more in state support than a man on
the average wage received in income in 1957. It's an eye-catching
reminder of how wrong J K Galbraith was to argue that affluence in
the late 1950s had already gone too far.
Now the Institute of Fiscal Studies has compiled data on average incomes in Britain since 1961,
coming to the remarkable conclusion that
in real terms the bottom 25% are now
considerable richer than were the top 25% in 1961.
Here's a graph, (hat tip Tim Worstall)
Of course this underestimates the increase in wealth because it
does not measure the extent to which many goods and services have
got cheaper during this time. Nor does it take any account of
innovations: the products of Vodafone, Starbucks and Google were
unobtainable at any price in 1961.
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