Jun 5, 2012

Commodity Prices - Coal in Declining Trend

The worries of a global slowdown pushed oil prices to less than $82 a barrel today... highlighting Porter's outlook of lower oil prices and higher natural gas prices. A global slowdown plays into Porter's belief... But he's more focused on the huge shift in the energy markets that's being driven by the incredible amount of oil being found in the United States. (For example, the oilfield we learned about at the Atlas meeting could be the second-biggest in U.S. history.)
Falling oil and low natural gas prices have destroyed the coal market... Coal – which fuels roughly half the electricity generated in the U.S. – competes directly with natural gas in the power market. But coal is much dirtier than clean-burning natural gas (which makes it unpopular with politicians). So with natural gas prices near record lows, the market is avoiding coal. You can see the result in the following chart of Peabody Coal (BTU)... the largest U.S. coal miner by volume...
 

May 22, 2012

Facebook Stumbles On IPO... Is It A Buy? by Robert Morris



The Facebook (FB) IPO was hailed as one of the greatest investment opportunities in stock market history.  But in the end, it can be summed up with just one word... 

ANTI-CLIMACTIC!

Investors had been anticipating for months that Facebook would soar on the IPO.  With nearly one billion users worldwide, Facebook is the 900 pound gorilla in the hugely popular social media business.  And most experts are projecting strong growth ahead for the company.
 
Nevertheless, the heavily hyped IPO fell flat on its, well... face.
The social media giant ended its first day of trading just 23 cents above the IPO price.  That translates to an opening day profit of less than 1%!
Clearly, not the huge first day gain most investors were expecting.
What's more, the stock's plunging further in early morning trade.  As I write, FB is down more than 12% at just over $33 per share.  And it's trading at a 13% discount to the IPO price.
 
Now, I must admit I'm not all that surprised by Facebook's cool market reception.
You may recall I was one of the few market analysts who predicted Facebook's IPO would fail to live up to the hype.  And in my article, Three Reasons Why I'm Not Buying The Facebook IPO, I urged my readers to avoid buying FB on the IPO.
However, with the share price dropping, many investors are starting to wonder if FB is now a good buy.
 
The short answer... Not yet!
Even at $33 per share, Facebook is still way overvalued in my humble opinion.  At that price, the stock is trading at a lofty 79x trailing twelve months' earnings.
Just how high is this multiple?
Try this on for size.  FB's PE ratio is more than 4x greater than Google's (GOOG).  And it's over 6x larger than Apple's (AAPL).
We haven't seen a valuation this high in the stratosphere since the dot com bubble of the late 1990s.
 
And given the company's recent struggles, it's hard to justify why FB deserves a higher PE than GOOG or AAPL.
Just last month, Facebook reported a weaker than expected first quarter.  Both revenue and earnings declined from the fourth quarter of 2012.  And to make matters worse, the drop was due to a downturn in the company's core business... internet advertising.
This is a big concern going forward.
In addition, the company now faces a potentially huge legal battle over the privacy rights of its users.

Shortly after the IPO, the company was sued by a group of current Facebook users.  The suit claims Facebook invaded users' privacy by tracking their internet usage.
Plaintiffs are seeking money damages to the tune of $15 billion.

This lawsuit is certain to be a major distraction for a management team just now making the difficult transition from private to public company. And if Facebook loses the suit, they may have to pay a fortune in money damages.
In fact, Facebook could end up paying out nearly every penny raised in the IPO.
 
Bottom line...
Even with the recent drop in price, Facebook shares are still highly overvalued.  Investors would be well served to let these shares fall to a more reasonable level before hitting the buy button.

Profitably Yours,
Robert Morris

Apr 2, 2012

THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLE

By Warren Buffett

 
Is the Graham and Dodd "look for values with a significant margin of safety relative to prices" approach to security analysis out of date? Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes. They argue that the stock market is efficient; that is, that stock prices reflect everything that is known about a company's prospects and about the state of the economy. There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors who seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky. "If prices fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out," writes one of today's textbook authors. 

Well, maybe. But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index. The hypothesis that they do this by pure chance is at least worth examining. Crucial to this examination is the fact that these winners were all well known to me and pre-identified as superior investors, the most recent identification occurring over fifteen years ago. Absent this condition - that is, if I had just recently searched among thousands of records to select a few names for you this morning -- I would advise you to stop reading right here. I should add that all of these records have been audited. And I should further add that I have known many of those who have invested with these managers, and the checks received by those participants over the years have matched the stated records.

Before we begin this examination, I would like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let's assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise, and they all call the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who called wrong. Each day the losers drop out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a little over $1,000. 

Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this, human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is, and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.

Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by this exercise, each have turned one dollar into a little over $1 million. $225 million would have been lost, $225 million would have been won.

By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on "How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning." Worse yet, they'll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, " If it can't be done, why are there 215 of us?"

By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same - 215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.

I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present. For one thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population is; if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he's feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.

Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer -- with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States -- and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it's not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.

I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.
Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimportant. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing. You would simply be identifying one case as a hundred cases. Similarly, let's assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father's call. Now, at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21.5 families. Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn't have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.

In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their "flips" in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.

The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist's concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks -- I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn't make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.

I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior, the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless data available about them. It isn't necessarily because such studies have any utility; it's simply that the data are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.

I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four -- I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after 

I took Ben Graham's class, but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously! After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us as the "peasant" level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up, and it's possible to trace the record of three.

The first example (see Table 1) is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what "Adam Smith" -- after I told him about Walter -- wrote about him in Supermoney (1972):
He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that's about it.
In introducing me to (Schloss) Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. "He never forgets that he is handling other people's money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss." He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real -- and from this flows an attraction to the "margin of safety" principle.
Walter has diversified enormously, owning well over 100 stocks currently. He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner. And that's all he does. He doesn't worry about whether it it's January, he doesn't worry about whether it's Monday, he doesn't worry about whether it's an election year. He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me. And he does it over and over and over again. He owns many more stocks than I do -- and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business; I don't seem to have very much influence on Walter. That's one of his strengths; no one has much influence on him.

The second case is Tom Knapp, who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back from the war, he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a noncredit basis, and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School, where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodd's course again, and took Ben Graham's course. Incidentally, 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again. The only difference is that now he owns the beach!

In 1968, Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson, also a Graham disciple, along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion, formed Tweedy, Browne Partners, and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy, Browne built that record with very wide diversification. They occasionally bought control of businesses, but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.
Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in 1957. The best thing he did was to quit in 1969. Since then, in a sense, Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects. There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire. But I think that any way you figure it, it has been satisfactory.

Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund, which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graham's class, Bill Ruane. After getting out of Harvard Business School, he went to Wall Street. Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Ben's course at Columbia, where we met in early 1951. Bill's record from 1951 to 1970, working with relatively small sums, was far better than average. When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all our partners, so he set up the Sequoia Fund. He set it up at a terrible time, just when I was quitting. He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors. I am happy to say that my partners, to an amazing degree, not only stayed with him but added money, with the happy result shown here.

There's no hindsight involved here. Bill was the only person I recommended to my partners, and I said at the time that if he achieved a four-point-per-annum advantage over the Standard & Poor's, that would be solid performance. Bill has achieved well over that, working with progressively larger sums of money. That makes things much more difficult. Size is the anchor of performance. There is no question about it. It doesn't mean you can't do better than average when you get larger, but the margin shrinks. And if you ever get so you're managing two trillion dollars, and that happens to be the amount of the total equity valuation in the economy, don't think that you'll do better than average!

I should add that in the records we've looked at so far, throughout this whole period there was practically no duplication in these portfolios. These are men who select securities based on discrepancies between price and value, but they make their selections very differently. Walter's largest holdings have been such stalwarts as Hudson Pulp & Paper and Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock Company and all those other names that come instantly to mind to even a casual reader of the business pages. Tweedy Browne's selections have sunk even well below that level in terms of name recognition. On the other hand, Bill has worked with big companies. The overlap among these portfolios has been very, very low. These records do not reflect one guy calling the flip and fifty people yelling out the same thing after him.

Table 5 is the record of a friend of mine who is a Harvard Law graduate, who set up a major law firm. I ran into him in about 1960 and told him that law was fine as a hobby but he could do better. He set up a partnership quite the opposite of Walter's. His portfolio was concentrated in very few securities and therefore his record was much more volatile but it was based on the same discount-from-value approach. He was willing to accept greater peaks and valleys of performance, and he happens to be a fellow whose whole psyche goes toward concentration, with the results shown. Incidentally, this record belongs to Charlie Munger, my partner for a long time in the operation of Berkshire Hathaway. When he ran his partnership, however, his portfolio holdings were almost completely different from mine and the other fellows mentioned earlier.

Table 6 is the record of a fellow who was a pal of Charlie Munger's -- another non-business school type -- who was a math major at USC. He went to work for IBM after graduation and was an IBM salesman for a while. After I got to Charlie, Charlie got to him. This happens to be the record of Rick Guerin. Rick, from 1965 to 1983, against a compounded gain of 316 percent for the S&P, came off with 22,200 percent, which probably because he lacks a business school education, he regards as statistically significant.

One sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn't take at all. It's like an inoculation. If it doesn't grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn't make any difference. They just don't seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he's applying it five minutes later. I've never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn't seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It's instant recognition, or it is nothing.

Table 7 is the record of Stan Perlmeter. Stan was a liberal arts major at the University of Michigan who was a partner in the advertising agency of Bozell & Jacobs. We happened to be in the same building in Omaha. In 1965 he figured out I had a better business than he did, so he left advertising. Again, it took five minutes for Stan to embrace the value approach.

Perlmeter does not own what Walter Schloss owns. He does not own what Bill Ruane owns. These are records made independently. But every time Perlmeter buys a stock it's because he's getting more for his money than he's paying. That's the only thing he's thinking about. He's not looking at quarterly earnings projections, he's not looking at next year's earnings, he's not thinking about what day of the week it is, he doesn't care what investment research from any place says, he's not interested in price momentum, volume, or anything. He's simply asking: what is the business worth?

Table 8 and Table 9 are the records of two pension funds I've been involved in. They are not selected from dozens of pension funds with which I have had involvement; they are the only two I have influenced. In both cases I have steered them toward value-oriented managers. Very, very few pension funds are managed from a value standpoint. Table 8 is the Washington Post Company's Pension Fund. It was with a large bank some years ago, and I suggested that they would do well to select managers who had a value orientation.

As you can see, overall they have been in the top percentile ever since they made the change. The Post told the managers to keep at least 25 percent of these funds in bonds, which would not have been necessarily the choice of these managers. So I've included the bond performance simply to illustrate that this group has no particular expertise about bonds. They wouldn't have said they did. Even with this drag of 25 percent of their fund in an area that was not their game, they were in the top percentile of fund management. The Washington Post experience does not cover a terribly long period but it does represent many investment decisions by three managers who were not identified retroactively.

Table 9 is the record of the FMC Corporation fund. I don't manage a dime of it myself but I did, in 1974, influence their decision to select value-oriented managers. Prior to that time they had selected managers much the same way as most larger companies. They now rank number one in the Becker survey of pension funds for their size over the period of time subsequent to this "conversion" to the value approach. Last year they had eight equity managers of any duration beyond a year. Seven of them had a cumulative record better than the S&P. The net difference now between a median performance and the actual performance of the FMC fund over this period is $243 million. FMC attributes this to the mindset given to them about the selection of managers. Those managers are not the managers I would necessarily select but they have the common denominators of selecting securities based on value.

So these are nine records of "coin-flippers" from Graham-and-Doddsville. I haven't selected them with hindsight from among thousands. It's not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners -- people I had never heard of before they won the lottery. I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character, and temperament. It's very important to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average; note their record in years when the general market was weak. While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock. A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses. Far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses. Their attitude, whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business, is the same. Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks; others concentrate on a handful. But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.

I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a "herd" on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

I would like to say one important thing about risk and reward. Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion. If someone were to say to me, "I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped one cartridge into it. Why don't you just spin it and pull it once? If you survive, I will give you $1 million." I would decline -- perhaps stating that $1 million is not enough. Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice -- now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward!

The exact opposite is true with value investing. If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it's riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case. The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.
One quick example: The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million, probably appreciably more. The company owned the Post, Newsweek, plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.

Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million. And, as a matter of fact, if you buy a group of such securities and you know anything at all about business valuation, there is essentially no risk in buying $400 million for $80 million, particularly if you do it by buying ten $40 million piles of $8 million each. Since you don't have your hands on the $400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that's not a difficult job.

You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety. You don't try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an enormous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only drive 10,000 pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing.
In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis, yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I've practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It's likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.

If you have a high-speed internet connection, you may prefer to go to the web address below of the speech (a 1.6 MB .pdf file), which has all of the tables.
http://www.tilsonfunds.com/superinvestors.pdf 

Mar 26, 2012

Stand or Fall – How Much Longer?


In an economy with few bright spots, the corporate sector has remained remarkably resilient and unusually profitable. US corporations are generally flush with cash and have managed to maintain historically high margins despite anemic growth and a lack of consumer confidence.
 
But how long can this continue? An unusual combination of low inflation, low interest rates, and just enough growth can probably sustain margins over the near term. The principal risks to corporate profitability are likely to come from either too little growth – the global economy slips back toward recession – or, ironically, a surge in growth that leads to higher interest rates, higher input prices, and higher wages. To the extent the global economy continues to muddle along, this may actually extend this unusual period of high corporate profitability.

Eventually, however, this benevolent combination will come to an end. When that occurs, how should investors position their portfolios? The answer depends on why margins are shrinking:
  • If margins compress due to a stalling economy, investors should do well to follow their instincts and get defensive. Historically, classic defensive sectors such as consumer staples, healthcare, and utilities have been the most resilient to margin compression due to a weak economy.
  • If the economy continues to rebound and ultimately inflation rather than growth is the culprit, investors may want to adopt a different approach, favoring natural resource companies that can benefit from rising prices.
In either case, investors may want to remain cautious on financials. While the sector appears cheap, unless one expects a return to a Goldilocks economy – strong growth and falling interest rates – this sector is vulnerable to both a stalling economy and rising rates.

Corporate America: Last Man Standing 
The 13th annual Global Automotive Executive Survey, conducted by KPMG and released on January 5, indicated that US auto brands should continue to increase market share over the next five years. The report went on to conclude, “Global executives see the American resurgence spurred by product innovation, continued improvement in product quality and restructuring activities.” This is a remarkable statement about an industry that less than four years ago faced an existential crisis, necessitating a federal bailout. It is also illustrative of a broader point: the US economy continues to struggle with an anemic recovery and long-term structural ills, but the corporate sector has rarely been healthier or more profitable.

US households are still trying to get out from under the prior decade’s debt binge, a process complicated by lackluster nominal wage growth. Meanwhile, the public sector is going in the opposite direction: expanding its balance sheet – both from a fiscal and monetary perspective – in an attempt to cushion the deleveraging of the household sector. While this may be necessary in the near term, it is unsustainable over the long term. The fiscal situation is further complicated by the noticeable lack of clarity or consensus on either entitlement or tax reform.
Source Bloomberg 12/31/2011

However, despite all of these considerable headwinds, US corporate profits recently eclipsed their 2006 peak (see Chart 1). This resurgence in profits is obviously not purely a function of stellar top-line growth, which would be a difficult trick in a weak recovery. Instead, much of the resurgence in earnings has rested in a rebound in corporate margins, which were decimated during the financial crisis.

During the last recession, margins troughed in fourth quarter 2008 at around 4.5% of GDP, an all-time low. Since then, profit margins have more than doubled, and at slightly more than 10% are right below their 2006 peak (see Chart 2).

Source Bloomberg 12/31/2011

Given the historical tendency of margins to revert to the mean – the long-term average is roughly 8.20% – and the weak nature of the recovery, many investors are wondering how long this virtuous state of affairs can continue.

Mar 22, 2012

Germany Set to Invest $260 Billion in a Renewable Revolution

By Dr. Kent Moors, Global Energy Strategist, Money Morning


The moment Germany announced its highly publicized decision to phase out nuclear energy in the wake of the Japanese triple disaster; observers began to ask one very important question.

Just what energy source would replace such a huge swath of power in Europe's dominant economy?


The short-term solution had to be natural gas.


But this would make Germany more dependent upon imported energy, especially from Russia.


In that sense, the nuclear phase-out made the Nord Stream pipeline - from Russia, under the Baltic Sea, to northern Germany - absolutely essential.


Today, the first line of the twin pipeline is already in operation. The second should be on line at the end of next year (if not sooner).


Then there is the other Russian project - South Stream. This one intends to move Russian and Central Asian gas into Southern and Central Europe.


Much of that will also reach Germany.


In addition, several pipeline projects are vying for the excess production from the second phase of the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz offshore development in the Caspian Sea.


Included among these is Nabucco, a venture to bypass Russia and transport gas into the Baumgarten hub in Austria for ongoing distribution.


Nabucco has long been the European Union favorite, but it has been unable to attract sufficient supplies. Three other pipeline proposals also are attempting to secure the Caspian gas for transit to Europe.


But there is a problem for Germany in all of this.


It does not want to form an increasing dependence upon imported gas to power its economy.


And this sentiment is driving one of the biggest alternative energy revolutions in recent memory.

The German Push Toward Wind and Solar Power

The 17 currently operating nuclear reactors in the country provide about 20% of the national electricity needs. Any replacement of those plants (where capital expenses are already sunk) will add significantly to the end costs of energy.

That means a political decision following the Fukushima Daiichi disaster one year ago ends up costing the average German citizen even more to secure what is already among the most expensive electricity in the world.


Germany does have shale gas.


But the furor over nuclear power is paralleled with a similar environmental concern regarding the dangers of fracking, a process of pumping water and chemicals under high-pressure to break open the rock and free the gas.


There are now four U.S. examples of seismic anomalies resulting from the combination of fracking and deep horizontal drilling.


And they have not instilled much confidence for the markets.


Instead, what the Germans are deciding to do is already being called the biggest restructuring of the national energy landscape since the end of World War II.


The government will initiate a campaign valued at more than $260 billion to harness wind and solar power.


The price tag is staggering. It is already pegged at more than 8% of the nation's entire gross domestic product (GDP). And it could move even higher.


This will involve huge wind farm areas in the Baltic and massive new high-power transit lines nationwide. The goal is to have at least 35% of the nation's power needs generated from renewable sources by 2020.


Germany has become the first nation to really tackle the rising energy crisis. To succeed, the country will need new technologies and fresh approaches, some not even yet on the drawing board.

The most important European market will transform into a massive energy laboratory. But success is hardly certain.


Either way, all eyes will focus on this huge German experiment.


It will cost German consumers even more than they pay now - some analysts say as much as 60% more. It holds captive the survival of a government, political careers, industrial prospects, and continental-wide financial policy.


As the Eurozone wrestles with debt contagion and questions the strength of cross-border banking, the main lynchpin of that zone - Germany - is embarking on a very ambitious and risky path.


For those accustomed to seeing renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, geothermal, and even biofuels dependent upon heavy government subsidies, the German experiment will be a significant change.


The large public sector injections of tax revenues and credits will still be there.


Germany will have to increase taxes to pull off this grand departure. That could make it the most expensive government debacle in recent memory.


What changes is this.

A Solid Market for Alternative Energy

For the first time, a huge, guaranteed market will be opening up for alternative energy.

It will require new developments, infrastructure, improvements, and breakthroughs to make it work.


In short, there will be a new playing field for well-focused, forward-looking, entrepreneurially driven energy firms.


Unlike any other alternative energy push in memory, this one will have both government support and an assured, expanding need.


In the months ahead, wind power pioneered in Denmark and major advances in solar from
China, along with a number of other ingredients introduced geographically in between, will converge on Germany.

That will translate into some huge profits over the next decade, both from new applications in Germany and the export potential to other countries.


A brave new world is underway for retail investment's next big return sector.

Mar 12, 2012

Wall Street Doesn't Like First Solar

First Solar now faces warranty claims that could bankrupt it… And unknown to Wall Street, I believe the company will also be the subject of a Justice Department investigation for foreign bribes.

This is as clear as I can be: Solar power will simply never work as a source of energy for the power grid. And by "work," I mean it will never be remotely economic. The reason has nothing to do with technical hurdles or innovations that have yet to be made. Solar power will never work because of the laws of nature – in particular, the Second Law of Thermodynamics…

Major investments are being made, driven by demands and financing from governments, to use photovoltaic semiconductor (PV) technology to convert sunlight into electricity for the power grid. I believe this is a tremendous waste of capital. It would NOT occur without the intervention of governments – which are notoriously bad at allocating capital – because it is horrendously inefficient. PV processes use photonic energy in sunlight (not heat) to "lift" electrons and create electricity. The thermodynamic limitations of this approach mean that many of the electrons fall back into the hole from whence they were lifted. That makes the panels very inefficient…

The catch is… in the real world, the materials needed to improve their efficiency are very rare and expensive. The other, even more important, catch is that the main impediment to PV efficiency is… heat. Yes, that's right. As PV solar cells are exposed to ambient temperatures above room temperature, their efficiency plummets. And seeing as how most of the places best-suited for solar power panels (like the roofs of buildings in warm climates) also have high ambient temperatures, I believe it's unlikely that this approach will ever prove worthwhile. I'm convinced that PV solar panels will never be economic.

The basic reason PV solar cells can't power the grid is simple: They do not generate heat. Without heat, there's no useful energy. That's a law of nature, not an engineering impediment. The hurdle manifests itself curiously… by changing the behavior of the electrons, rendering the PV solar cells almost totally inefficient above room temperatures.

A writer at TheStreet.com explained it this way yesterday: "Imagine a company that has predicated its future on building out large-scale projects in desert conditions. Now imagine the technology the company uses doesn't have a long-term track record of performing under intense heat. You don't have to imagine the company. It's First Solar…"

As a result of this problem, First Solar isn't going to commission its Mesa Arizona PV manufacturing plant. It's ceasing production at a plant in Germany, and it's no longer going to build a plant in Vietnam.

What will it do instead? Pay a lot of money in refunds.

So far, First Solar has spent a total of $125 million on warranty claims. It says future claims are likely to be "only" $44 million. I'd bet future warranty claims are closer to 10 times that amount.

The big problem for First Solar is that the company guarantees power efficiency – for solar panels that rapidly degrade under heat. These problems have already cost the company millions of dollars from panels made in 2008 and 2009. And the company says future losses from these problems will be limited. But the truth is, the company doesn't actually know – and can't know – how much it faces in future losses. The following is an excerpt from First Solar's 10-k…

Although our power output warranty extends for 25 years, our oldest solar modules manufactured during the qualification of our pilot production line have only been in use since 200 1. Because of the limited operating history of our solar modules, we have been required to make assumptions regarding the durability and reliability of our solar modules. Our assumptions could prove to be materially different from the actual performance of our solar modules, causing us to incur substantial expense to repair or replace defective solar modules in the future.


So… despite the fact that First Solar doesn't actually know how its panels will perform in the real world and that everyone with any knowledge of PV physics knows the panels won't work in hot environments… the company has made huge, long-tail promises to buyers. First Solar's 10-K continues…

We also warrant to our owners that solar modules installed in accordance with agreed-upon specifications will produce at least 90% of their power output rating during the first 10 years following their installation and at least 80% of their power output rating during the following 15 years. As a result, we bear the risk of extensive warranty claims long after we have sold our solar modules and recognized net sales.


I think all of us are familiar with what happens to companies that pay out royalties and stock options for net sales booked today, when the real costs of fulfilling those sales evolve over decades. Think Enron.

Despite all these obvious problems, some people on Wall Street still don't get the sham. Jeff Osborn, analyst with the financial services firm Stifel Financial, says, "We see the disclosed heat-driven degradation issue as lowering the economics of expanding into new markets and potentially posing a product acceptance risk."

A "product acceptance risk"? Ah… the product doesn't work. It never has. And First Solar sold it mostly to governments, which were too stupid to care… or were they?

I've been wondering for a long time why anyone – even a government – would buy these things. Well… maybe there's an obvious reason: They were bribed. First Solar all but admits it bribes local government officials in many of the places where it operates…

We currently operate in, and pursuant to our Long Term Strategic Plan intend to further expand into, many parts of the world that have experienced governmental corruption to some degree and, in certain circumstances, strict compliance with anti-bribery laws may conflict with local customs and practices.


In addition, due to the level of regulation in our industry, our entry into new jurisdictions, including India, China, and the Middle East, requires substantial government contact where norms can differ from U.S. standards… our employees, subcontractors and agents may take actions in violation of our policies and anti-bribery laws. Any such violation, even if prohibited by our policies, could subject us to criminal or civil penalties or other sanctions, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, cash flows and reputation.


While nothing in life is certain… I am more and more convinced that First Solar will actually go to zero.

One last thing to keep your eye on… Last December, Warren Buffett, through MidAmerican Energy, spent $2 billion to finance a First Solar power plant (the Topaz plant in California). The plant is scheduled to be completed by 2015. The deal was heralded as a triumph for solar energy, as the plant failed to get a Department of Energy loan and was the first large, privately financed plant to be built… except it wasn't really…

It turns out, 30% of the construction cost was covered by a Treasury Department cash grant. Furthermore, the plant was built because California's PG&E power utility promised to buy power from the plant (at absurdly high prices) for the next 25 years. As a government-regulated monopoly, PG&E will pass these costs on to its customers, whether they like it or not.

Buffett, meanwhile, will collect hundreds of millions of dollars from making the loan and pose for all of the accompanying goodwill. But what will happen when the plant doesn't work… and the bribes become public… and the whole thing blows up? I'm sure Buffett will walk away saying he knew nothing about it…

Mar 1, 2012

America Is Proving "Peak Oilers" Are Utterly Mistaken

By Matt Badiali, editor, S&A Resource Report

If you think we're running out of oil, you're wrong…

I just got back from this year's giant North American Petroleum Expo (NAPE) in Houston, where all the talk was new oil production coming online.

Some commentators won't buy it. But there's an oil boom going on right here in the U.S.

The boom is coming from new drilling in shale rock. Shale is made up of flat layers, like pages of a book. The good ones are full of organic material that becomes oil and gas.

A decade ago, no one believed you could economically extract energy resources from shale rock. But new technologies (like horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing) have allowed us to tap vast new resources. Back in 2000, it was all about natural gas shales. Today, it's all about oil.

The great thing about these new oil wells is how low-risk they are. These are rocks that are all well-known. We've been drilling through them for decades. They're right here in the U.S. This isn't like drilling miles below the ocean. And it's not like exploring in some unstable African dictatorship. That means there's no political or exploration risk.

Take the Bakken shale for example. The Bakken is huge. It underlies about 200,000 square miles of North Dakota, Montana, and Saskatchewan. It holds about 400 billion barrels of oil. We know where the oil is… Until recently, it just refused to come out.

However, engineers cracked the code, and now we're pumping over 114 million barrels per year out. Oil production in the Bakken is up 310% in just six years. Bakken oil makes up nearly 8% of U.S. oil production today.

The Bakken and its cousins are creating a renaissance in U.S. oil production. Here's a chart of U.S. oil production over the last 20 years. As you can see, after years of decline, the trend is heading UP. That's due to shale production like we're seeing in the Bakken.


We saw something just like this in the early 2000s with natural gas shales… And early investors in natural gas shale producers made a fortune. Companies like Ultra Petroleum, Range Resources, and Pioneer Natural Resources soared thousands of percent from 2000 to today.

I think the same could happen with companies drilling for shale oil. I'm looking at oil producers with big land positions in "oily" shales like the Utica shale (in the northeastern U.S.), the Granite Wash (in Texas), and the Tuscaloosa Marine shale (in Louisiana and Mississippi). These include companies like Chesapeake Energy (CHK), Carrizo (CRZO), and Linn Energy (LINE).

If you're betting on peak oil, you're losing. If you're betting on more oil production in the U.S., I expect you'll make a lot of money over the next few years.